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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JERRY ARTHUR VVHITE,
Plaintif{-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

NICOLE EDITH WHITE,
Defendant-Appellant.

12960 .

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE.l\IJ1JNT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action for a divorce in which the plaintiff sought a division of the marital estate and the
custody of the parties' only child, Nicolette White. The
defendant counterclaimed seeking a decree of divorce,
a division of the marital estate, the custody of the
parties' only child, Nicolette vVhite, child support, alimony and attorney's fees.
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The court awarded the plaintiff a divorce on
grounds of mental cruelty, the care and custody of the
parties' only child, Nicolette "\Vhite, on the grounds
that the defernlant was an unfit mother, and denied the
defendant's request for alimony and attorney's fees.
The defendant appeals from those portions of the Decree of Divorce which awarded the plaintiff the divorce
and the care and custody of the parties' only child, Nicolette "\Vhite.

HELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the Decree of Divorce
awarded jointly to both parties. the custody of the
parties' only chikl, Nicolette "r'hite awarded to her, and
the costs and attorney fees that she has incurred in
prosecuting this appeal awanle(l to her.
STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

Appellant and respondent were married 011 June
13, HH:i-t, in Twenty-Xine Palms, California. (T.T.
iO) * One child, Nicolette "Thite, was born to the parties
on FebruarY 23. 1968. (T.'J'. :3). On or about August
10, 1 !lil, r~sponclent filed a Complaint in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, seeking a Decree of Di*( 1 ~ote: T.T. refers to the Trial Transcript)
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vorcc m1 gromuls of mental cruelty and praying for an

awanl to him of the care and custody of the parties
011 ly child, Nicolette "Thite. The defendant counterclaime<l seeking a Decree of Divorce on grounds of
mental cruelty and praying, among other things, for the
award of Nicolette's custody.
~

The case came on for trial before the Honorable
l\I erriJl C. Faux, District Judge of the District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on April 25 and
2G, rn72. On l\lay 26, 1972, the Court entered its Findi11gs of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Decree of
Dirnrce and made the following determinations: ( 1) respondent was entitled to a divorce on grounds of mental
cruelty; ( 2) appellant's morals were "repulsive to the
sta11dard in this comrmrnity"; and (3) due to appellant's
morals it would be "in the best interests of the minor
child of the parties to award the care, custody and control of the minor child" to respondent. ( F.F. 2) *
The evidence does not, however, support to any
degree the court's determinations of either fact or law.
"That uncontradicted evidence does indicate is that appellant is a model mother who has never neglected or
abused her child. ( T.T. 71). In fact, appellant had been
ahle, clue to her educational achievements and ability, to
secure a job that provided her and her child with a comfortable living ($700.00/month) while working only
IG-18 hours per week, thus minimizing the amount of
*(Note: F.F. refers to the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law)
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time that she had to spend away from her chil<l ( T.T.
4;)-.')()). In fact, she spent even less time than this away
from X icolette since 4-6 hours of her working time
were actually spent at home preparing lessons and correcting papers. ( T.'l'. J.f3). Finally, in order to insure
that X icolette would be properly cared for during what
little time ~he had to spend away from her, appellant
had engaged an ol<ler, mature woman, who had been appron~d hy county authorities to care for young children,
to care for Xicolette during her absenses. ( T.T. 4G).
In contrast to this the record reflects only that respornlcnt had a goml relationship with Nicolette; it is
silent as to his personal ability to care for her. (T.'f.
11).
The reeord does shnw, however, that respondent
had committed a<lultery at least once and that this had
O('curre<l prior to the separation of the parties in the
s11111111er of H>7J. ( T.T. 55-56). Even more important,
respondent throughout the last few years of the parties'
marriage Juul repeatedly threatened appellant's life.
(T.'l'. ;)':.?-5:3). In fad, the day before the trial, respondent told appellant that she "was )ucky to he alive;
that he had spared .. [her].'' (T.'f. 5:3). Furthermore,
respondent at various times physically as well ~s
verbalk threatened appellant. ( T.T . .5:3-54). In adchtion, r~spondent often mldressed appellant in a vile and
filthy manner. (T.'l'. 53).
:Moreover, respondent had been a heavy user of a
wi<le variety of dangerous and illegal drugs at various
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ti1ncs during the course of the parties' marriage. He ad-

mitted for example to having usecl marijuana, amphetamines, harbituates, and methaclrine repeatedly over a
m1111bcr of years. (T.T. 9a & 9<>). MoroYer, respondent's
job rccp1ires him to work at least thirty hours per wee!.\
for which he only recei\'es $tLH./hour, and he spends
additional time, up to ten ( 10) hours per week, away
from home attending to school work. ( T.T. 87). Not
only do respondent's personal circumstances dictate
that he spend well O\ er twice as much time away from
X icolette than appellant's circumstances require, th<~
,,
people with whom he has arranged to place Nicolet((·
during his absence are notably lacking in qualifications
for such a high trust. The husband of this couple is a
nineteen year old, sometimes employed "long hair."
( T.T. 114-115). The mother is herself only a child of
se,·enteen. (T.T. 114). Needless to say, this couple
cloes not have any certification by any governmental
hod y attesting to their fitness to care for young children. (T.T. 114).
Insofar as appellant's morals are concerned, the
evidence in<licates only that appellant had relations with
two different men on several different occasions. (T.T.
5-G & 22) . Moreover, both of these involvements occurrecl after the onset of the difficulties between the
parties. ( T.T. 52-53, 67-68, and 78-79). There is absolutelv no eYidence in the record that indicates in any
fashio~ that appellant ever conducted herself improperly with a man in front of her child.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The evidence, rnorem'er, clearly establishes that
appellant was not a heavy drug user but rather had onlv
smoked marijuana twice and hashish once and had onl~
taken a hallucenogenic drug, psilocybin, once. All of'
these instances had occurred approximately nine months
before the trial and ha,·e never been repeated. (T.T.
4:3) . The evidence also establishes without contradiction
that appellant rarely consumes alcohol and then only
wine as a beverage wi~h a meal. ('f.T. 43).

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
TIIE

COURT CLEARLY ABUSED
ITS DISCHE'l'IO"N" IN A 'V ARD ING
TILE DIVORCE TO RESPONDENT
RATHER T II AN TO BOTH RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT
JOINTLY.
A.

The trial court abused its discretion in
foiling to grant the divorce to both parties
under circumstances where the facts indicate that both parties are equally at fault.

In iJlullins v. ft-lullins, 26 Utah 2d 82, 485 P.2d
663, ()64 ( 1971), the Utah Supreme Court stated as
follows:
"There seems to be nothing in our statute or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
in logic that would prevent a dissolution of this
marriage by granting a divorce to both, where
the facts fault each equally as respect to
grounds therefor ... "
B.

The determination of what constitutes
mental cmelty must be made from the
facts of each case.

In Stet'enson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2d 153, 369
P .2d 923 ( 1962), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirm~d
a long line of cases extending back to Doe v. Doe, 46
Utah 200, 158 P. 781 (1916), in holding as follows:
"'Vhether defendant's conduct was cruel and
whether it caused plaintiff to suffer great
mental distress, can only be determined in
light of the sensibility of this particular plaintiff. Persons' sensibilities may vary due to
their different degrees of intelligence, refinement, delicacy of health, etc. For this reason,
the same conduct may constitute mental cruelty in one case and not in another. The ultimate
answer depends not so much on defendant's
conduct, but rather on the effect such conduct
had upon the plaintiff." 369 P.2d at 923.
The trial court in that case had refused to grant
the plaintiff wife a divorce on grounds of mental cruelty where the wife had among other things established
that her husband had treated her like a slave, expecting
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

her to serve his every need, had falsely accused her of
marital infidelity, and had falsely acct;sed her of being
mentally ill. The court held that these facts, coupled
with the evidence that the plaintiff greatly feared her
husband. constituted a sufficient showing of mental
cmelty to warrant the granting of a divorce and on remarnl directed the trial court to enter a decree in plaintiff's favor. Hfin P.2d at !):2.J.-25.
In .loh11.w11 i:'. .lohnson, 107 Utah 147, 152 P.2d
42() ( l!H4), the court affirmed the award of a <lh'orce
to the plaintiff wife \vherein the evidence adduced at
triitl established that the defendant had called the plaintiff. at times i11 the presence of their children, vile and
abusive names, had accused her of marital infidelity
ancl had once, without 1n·ovocation, beat one child over
the head with his fist in her presence. The wife had alleged that this conduct on the defendant's part had
('aused her mental pain and suffering. 152 P.2d at ,J.27.
In Curr.11 v. Curr!J, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d 930
( U);j8), the husband was awarded the divorce but the
wife was awarded the custody of their children. The
husband on appeal claimed first that he should have
heen awarded the children since he was awarded the
divorce. hut the Court rejected this argument. I-le then
argued that he only wanted the divorce if he could keep
the children and, since the trial court had awarded the
children to his wife, he would waive the decree of divorce that had been awarded to him if the Supreme
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Court proved unwilling to award the children to him.
An integral part of his argument in this regard was
that only he had grounds for divorce and that the trial
court had so found by awarding the divorce to him. The
Supreme Court answered this argument by finding that
the trial court could have awarded his ,\,ife the divorce
on the evidence contained in the record that was before
it. The Court in assessing this evidence first noted that
the rule in Utah was that the showing of mental cruelty
which a complainant had to make in order to be entitled
to a divorce varied with the sensibilities of each complainant and the facts and circumstances of each case.
l t then reviewed the evidence in the record which showed
that the husband was very antagonistic towards organized religion unlike either his wife or his children,
that he had acted in a very superior and condescending
manner towards both his wife and children, and that he
had accused his wife of marital infidelities. The Court
held that on this record the wife would have been entitled to an award of the divorce if the trial court had
so chosen since even a person of ordinary sensibilities
would suffer severe mental anguish and distress as a
result of the husband's attitudes, conduct and actions as
set forth above. 321 P.2d at 742-43.
C.

From a review of the record m the instant case it is clear that appellant is no
more responsible for the dissolution of the
marriage than respondent.
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ln the instant case, the record is clear that the appellant possessed more than adequate grounds for divorce. Hespornlent had himself at least once committed
adultery. ( T.T. 55-~36). This fact by itself had caused
appellant a great deal of pain and suffering. (T.T. 67()8). Even more important, respondent throughout the
last few years of the parties' marriage had repeatedly
threatened appellant's life. ( T.'J'. 52-5:3). In fact, the
clay before the trial, respondent told appellant that she
"was lucky to be alive; that he had spared .. [her]."
( T.T. 53). All of these facts are uncontradicted and
have never been denied by respondent ..l\Ioreover, respondent at various times physically as well as verbally
threatenecl appellant. ( T.'l'. 5H-54). In fact, appellant
testified that for several months after the incident at
her apartment in Sall Lake City over the 1971 Thanksgi,·in<r holi<lays when respondent, lrithout permission
entered her apartment and assaulted l\Ir. Issel (T.T.
88-:J\,, & !)()), she lived in constant fear of bodily
harm from respo11clent. ( 'f .'!'. 54). Digressing for a
moment, several other things should also be noted about
this episode: First, respondent was not living with appellant at the time this incident occurred. I-le had moved
out earlier awl was then living at 1143 East Ninth
South, Salt Lake City, Utah. ( T.'f. 9-11). Second, respondent's violent conduct so frightened appellant that
she called the police. ( 'l'.T. 39).
Respondent uot only verbally and physically
threatened appellant's physical well being, he also quite
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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often wldrcssed her in a Yile, coarse manner. He, for

example, has often called her a "bitch" and a "slut"
( T.T. 5:3) a practice which he initiated far in advance'
of any infidelity on appellant's part. (T.T. 66).
Finally, respondent throughout the course of the
parties' marriage continually attempted to stifle appellant's educational goals and desires and sought to haYe
her subordinate her needs and aspirations to that of his
own. ( T.T. 50-;32, 63 & 75-76). Hespondent did not, for
example, approve of appellant taking one or h\;o
classes, let alone a full load. (T.T. 63). Respondent's
stated reason for 11ot wanting appellant to further her
education was that it prevented her from taking proper
care of Nicolette. ( T.T ..51). That this was not the true
reason for his feelings is revealed by the fact that he
expected her to work at a job in order to provide them
with a liYing. (T.T. 53). Appellant in fact worked consistently to support them, apparently without any objedion from respondent, while respondent was in
school, both as, an undergraduate (T.T. 35) and as a.
gracluate student ( T.T. 36). Respondent's true concerns about his daughter is also reflected by the fact
thnt between December 1, 1971, and the date of trial,
April 25, 1972, a period of almost five months, respondent contributed a grand total of five dollars ($5.00)
towards Nicolette's support. (T.T. 69) ·

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
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HEYEHSIBLE ERROR BY rnVARDING 'l'IIJ~ CUSTODY OF TI-IE CIIILD
TO HESPONDENT AND BY NOT
A 'V ARDING SAID CUSTODY TO APPELLANT.
A.

Divorce actions are equitable in nature
and on appeal the Supreme Court has the
authority to review the record de nova and
to substitute its OWH judgment for that of
the trial court if in its judgment the trial
court committed a clear abuse of discretion or if the trial court's judgment is
against a clear preponderance of the evidence.

The Utah Supreme Conrt has long held that it
possesses the power in an equitable action such as a
divorce to review the record de nova and to render its
own judgment thereon if it belie\'es that the trial court
has committed a clear abuse of discretion ( JJTilson v.
1Vilson, 5 Utah 2d 7!l, 84<, 2~)() P .2d 977 ( 1956) ) , or
if it believes that the trial court's judgment is contrary
to a clear preponderance of the evidence. 111 acDonald v.
1llaclJonald, l:W Utah .37B, 2BG P.2d lOHG ( 1951).
As the following discussion will reveal, the trial
court's findings that appellant is morally unfit to have
Xicolette's custody and that Nicolette's best interests
would be served by a warding her custody to respondent
are contrary to a clear preponderance of the evidence.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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l\Ioreover, this discussion will also reveal that the trial
court plainly abused its discretion by awarding Nicolette
to respondent.

B.

Under Utah Law the presumption is "that
the mother is best suited to care for young
children." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10
(Supp. 1971)

In Dearden v. Dearden, 15 Utah 2d 105, 388 P.2d
:mo (1 !W4) the Court held that there was a "universally
recoginzed presumption that it is for the best interests
and welfare of a child of such tender years to be with
her mother." 15 Utah 2<l at 108. The Comt then stated
that,
"the mother's right to custody should not be
denied unless it is shown that she is such an immoral, incompetent or otherwise improper person that it would be contrary to the child's best
interest and welfare to he in her custody." 15
Utah 2d 108-109; Accord, Chase v. Chase, 15
Utah 2d 81, 83, 387 P.2d .556 (1963) (There
must be "some substantial and compelling
reason to deprive her [the mother J of . . ·
[the child's] custody.")
It should be noted that the language quoted above
from the Dearden decision is completely in accord with
th~ standard set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section
30-3-10 (Supp. 1971) which section was amended by the
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legislature in lHGH, to make it specifically apply to dinn:cc aetions. It should also be note<l that in Briggs v.
Bnp;,t.!,·s. 111 Utah 418, 181 P.2d 22H, 228 (l!J47), the
Utah Supreme Court set forth the requirements of this
statute (which has not been substantively changed since
that decision with the exception, as noted above, that it
is now applicable to divorce actions) as follows:
"Under this statute the mother is entitled to the
custody of the child unless is is made to appear
to the contrary.
Thus the burden of convincin()'
•
0
the court is on the fa th er. 'Ve must also keep
in mind that ordinarily no one can take the
place of a mother in the life of a girl of this
age." 181 P.2<1 at 228
C.

The critical issue in determining whether
a mother is morally unfit to have the
custody of her child is whether her conduct
is of such a nature as to hazard the child's
welfare and render it unwise that the
child he placed in her mother's custody.

In the Dearden case, supra the tiral court awarded
both the divorce to the husband (on the grounds of
mental cruelty) and the custody of the parties' 2 Yz year
ol<l daughter after finding that the mother was morally
unfit to have the custody of her daughter. The trial
court based this finding on the fact that the husband's
evidence indicated that the mother had engaged in an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

acl11ltcro11s course of conduct, extending over a several
J11onth period of time, with another man. The Utah Supreme Court emphatically rejected these findings as a
basis for denying the mother the custody of the child,
stating first that:
"It is generally held that such misconduct as
fournl against plaintiff, although of course
censurahle ancl not to be condoned, will not
necessarily of itself deprive a parent of her
child. Social ideas have changed, considerably
since the time of the 'East Lynne' concept
when for moral transgression a wife was cast
into outer darkness and deprived of all, including her children." l;3 Utah 2d at 107

See also, Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah GH2, 244 P.2d 650,
ti;)2 ( In52) where the Court stated: "The fact that she
li\·ed with a man whom she expected to many, although
c·cnsurahlc, does not in itself make her an unfit and
improper person to have the custody of her child.";
and Bal~cr v. Bal.:cr. 25 Utah 2d 337, 481 P.2d 672
( rn11)

The Court in Dearden then stated the applicable
standard as follows:
"The critical question for consideration is
whether the conduct shown is of such a nature
as to hazard her [the child's] welfare and make
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it unwise that she be in her mother's custody."
15 Utah 2d at 107
The Court then held, having assumed that the trial
court's finding that the mother was guilty of adulterv
was ndicl, that there was no indication
.
"of anything base or depraved or erratic in
plaintiff's attitude toward or treatment of her
daughter or in her relationship with her. On
the contrary, there was testimony that the
plaintiff was a 'fine housekeeper' and a 'very
good mother.' The trial court found that the
plaintiff was 'a neat and orderly housekeeper'
and there is no evidence that she has directly
or intentionally mistreated the child." 15 Utah
2d at 108.
That the Court's central concern in cases involving
a claim that the mother is morally unfit to have the
custody of her child is whether or not the mother's conduct directly affects both her relationship with her child
and the care and treatment which she provides the child
is made manifestly clear by the Court's explication of
its decision in lllcBroom v. JJJcJJroom, 14 Utah 2d 393,
384 P.2d 961 ( 1963) in its opinion in Dearden, supra.
In the 111 cJJ room case the trial court awarded the divorce
to the husband, hut the custody of the parties' two children to the wife. The husband appealed and the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's custody award
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on the grounds that the children's best interests would
he sened thereby. The evidence upon which the Court
based its decision indicated among other things that she
had been
"persistently guilty of indiscretions, including leaving the home on numerous occasions
and staying out until the small hours of the
morning. The circumstances shown indicate[d]
to a practical certainty that she was in an improper relationship with a married man . . . "
14 Utah 2d at p. mw.
The e\'iclence in the 1llcBroum case also indicated that
the wife often came home in the early hours of the morning under the influence of alcohol, and unable to properly care for the children. It also showed that she used
vile language in front of the children and left salacious
and obscene material around the house in places easily
accessible to the children. Moreover, it further indicated
that she often refused to engage in various activities
with the children. Furthermore, there was evidence to
the effect that she "·'US a poor housekeeper who didn't
prepare proper meals for her family and there was also
evidence to the effect that she had, during the pendeucy
of the appeal, attempted to alienate the children's affection toward their father and had punished them
whenever they had any contact with him. Finally, there
was evidence to the ef feet that the mother had arranged
to leave the children with "babysitters" during the day
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time when the ehilclren weren't in school. The hushancl
on the other hand had arranged for his mother to care
for the children in his absence in the event the court
awarded the children to him. 14 Utah 2d at 396-97.
From a reading of the Court's opinion in lJicBroom,
as a whole, it appears clear that its decision to reverse
the trial court and award the children to the husband
was not based upon the wife's sexual misconduct but
rather on the fact that the evidence clearly indicated
that she was a poor mother, from whom the children
received substandard treatment. 'Vhatever doubt may
exist in this regard due to the Court's recitation of her
sexual misconclnct along with the rest of the evidence
was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in the Dearden
case, .rn pra. The husband there relied heavily on the
11/cBroom decision as a basis for his appeal. The Court,
however, held that the husband's reliance was misplaced
because "while immorality was involved [in that case],
erratic behavior was manifest in the [wife's] attitude
toward and treatment of the children which was deemed
to ha,.;anl their [the children's] welfare." 15 Utah 2d at
] 08,

ll.

4.

Of added significance is the fact that despite, in
.1.llclJroom, the mother's gross neglect of and inattention to her parental responsibilities and obligations as
established by the evidence in that case, the Supreme
Court still directed the district court to review the
custody award two years from the date of its remittitur
of the. case to the district court. 14 Utah 2d at 398.
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In the instant case there is no indication whatsothat appellant's sexual cornluct has ever been "of
s11eh a nature as to hazard ... [the child's] welfare and
rnake it m1wise that she be in her mother's custody"
Dearden, supra, 15 Utah 2d at 107. The record is in
fact barren of any evidence that appellant has ever conducted herself in an improper manner in front of her
child. The evidence uniformly does show, however, that
appellant has always been a wonderful mother. Respondent in fact testified on direct examination by his
own attorney as follows:
C\'er

Q.

During the time that you and _l\Irs. White
were residing together as man and wife,
did you have occasion to observe how she
took care of and treated your daughter?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

In your opinion, did she ever fail to properly bathe and clean your daughter?

A.

No.

Q.

In your opinion, did she ever fail to properly feed your daughter?

A.

No.

Q.

She prepared meals, correctly?

A.

Yes.

Q.

In your opinion, did she ever fail to properly clothe the child?
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A.

No sir.

(~.

She keep a dirty house?

.A.

No sir. (T.T. 71).

l\l<>reover, Barbara Dmm Lancaster, a witness who was
callc1l on hchalf of the appellant, testified, after having
testified that she had known both of the parties for
many years (T.T. 99), that she had worked as both a
fourth grade teacher and as a teacher in the Ileaclstart
program (T.T. 103), that she had tended Nicolette for
appellant on numerous occasions (T.T. 99) and that
she had obse1Tcd appellant arnl Nicolette together at
least ~08 different times ( T.'l'. 103), that in her opinion, based on her experience with children, and the
familiarity which she had both with appellant and Nicolette and their relationship, appellant was "definitely"
a "fit and proper mother." ( T.T. 104). She then stated
that "if there teas milJmze that I wonld be delighted to
111odcl as a mother, it would be Nicole [appellant]"
(T~T. 104). (Emphasis added)
In addition to these facts, uncontradicted evidence
also indicates that appellant had arranged her employment prior to the trial of this action so that she would
be away from Xicolette no more than 14 hours per
week . .'.\Joreover, she had secured an older, mature, county appnffe<l woman to care for Nicolette during the
time that she was required to spend away from her.
( T.T. 56). In contrast to this, respondent's employment
and school work required him to be away from Nico-
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lette between HO and 40 hours per week. (T.T. 87).
~loreover, the people that he secure<l to care for Nicolette during his absences do not appear to Le well qualifiecl for the job. The husband is only nineteen years
old and apparently does not lmve a stable employment
record. ( T.T. 114). Respondent in fact admitted that
he could be characteri'./,ed as a "long hair." ( T.T. 114115). His wife, who is most responsible for caring for
Nicolette is hut herself a child of seventeen years of
age. ( T.T. 114) ..1\Ioreover, neither of these persons
has been approved hy any govemmental agency or body
as being fit to care fOL' young children. ( T. T. 114).
One final factor is worthy of note in this appeal.
A review of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and especially the statements and observations that the court made throughout the course
of trial (see 'l'.T. 91-92, 12,J.-26 & 130) reveals that the
court is of the view that "the 'East Lynne' concept when
for moral transgression a wife was cast into outer darkness ancl dep1fred of all, including her children," is still
a viable rule of law in Utah. As this Court made quite
clear in Dearden, however, that view or rule of law has
been completely discarded and abandoned for all time
hy the Utah courts.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully requested that the Court set aside both the trial court's
award of the divorce to respondent and the trial court's
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a warcl of Nicolette to respondent and exercise the
authority which it has in a divorce action to review the
record de no'l'o, JJril.wn 'l'. TVilson, supra; an<l T:Vicse v.
JV icsc, 24 Utah 2d 2an, 2H8, 4()9 P .2d 504 ( 1970) and
decree its own judgment awarding both appellant and
responclent the divorce and awarding Nicolette's permanent custody to appellant. In the alternative, appellant
requests that the judgment of the district court awarding the divorce and the custody of Nicolette 'Vhite to
respondent be reversed and that the same be remanded
to the trial court with directions to enter a decree of divorce in the names of both parties and to award Nicolette's custody to appellant.
Appellant has incurred substantial costs and attorney fees in prosecuting this appeal an<l respectfully requests that the Court award her costs and her attorney
fees in an amount to be set by the Court.

DATED this ________ day of ------------------------· 1972.
Respectfully submitted

YAX COTT, BAGLEY,
COHN'V ALL & :l\IcCARTHY
Stephen D. Swindle
Robert :K. 'Veatherbee

Attorneys for Appellant
Suite 300, 141 East l<-,irst South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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